Abstract. Security begins with good software code and high quality testing of the code, and it continues with the process used to identify corrected and patch security vulnerabilities and with their auditing based on recognized standards. Security is an important aspect of software systems, especially for distributed security-sensitive systems. The Common Criteria (CC) is the standard requirements catalogue for the evaluation of security critical systems. Using the CC, a large number of security requirements on the system itself and on the system development can be defined. However, the CC does not give methodological process support. In this paper, we show how integrate security aspects into the software engineering process. In addition, we also introduce our work on ensuring the reliability assurance in development process for Network Management System as TOE. The activities and documents from the Common Criteria are tightly intertwined with the system development, which improves the quality of the developed system and reduces the additional cost and effort due to high security requirements.
Introduction
Developing security critical system is very difficult. Security cannot simply be tested, but has to be ensured during the whole development process. To solve this problem, there are highly sophisticated collections of evaluation criteria that security critical systems have to meet, like the ITSEC security evaluation criteria or their recent successor, the Common Criteria (CC) [1, 2, 3] . The Common Criteria describes security related functionality to be included into a system, like authentication, secrecy or auditing, and assurance requirements on its development. The assurance requirements are structured into levels (evaluation assurance levels, EAL). The strictest level is EAL7, where a formal representation of the high-level design and formal proofs of correspondence with the security requirements must be provided. When a system could be evaluated successfully based on the Common Criteria, it is given a certificate, which shows the trustworthiness of the system and is in some cases legally required. Howev-er, the CC requirements have complex dependencies and the CC does not give any guidance on how to fulfill them during the development process. Conversely, current software development methodologies such as the V-Model or the Catalysis approach lack adequate support for security [4, 5] .
Integration of security into system development is necessary to build secure systems. in this paper, we show how to develop secure systems based on the Common Criteria. For this purpose, the required activities and documents are integrated tightly into the development process. Our methodology is independent of a particular assurance level, and to achieve very high assurance provides the possibility to use formal models for the critical parts of the system. The security measures are carried out during the entire process, as early as possible when they become relevant. This ensures that security problems are discovered when they are still easy to counter. Besides, development documents can be re-used for evaluation purposes and vice versa, and documentation is written when knowledge about the relevant details is still available. The process we used improves the quality (by its requirements on designs, testing or configuration management) and trustworthiness of the system and reduces evaluation time and cost. We demonstrate our ideas by means of the CBD-NMS (Component Based Development-Network Management System) Formal modeling and verification techniques were used to ensure the security of the applied communication protocols (required for evaluation at EAL7). The smooth project realization, the short development time and the high quality of the network management system shows the value of the CC-based process for the development of secure systems.
An approach to security characterization
Security is an important aspect of software systems, especially for distributed securitysensitive systems. When we assemble systems from existing components, it is vital that we must be clear about the security characteristics of these components and their impact on the target systems. In order to provide such security-related information for components and component-based systems, a model for their security characterization is required to augment our frame-work for component interface definition.
Security of information technology products and systems
Over the years, there has been much effort in evaluating Information Technology (IT) security, i.e., the security properties of IT products and systems, including hardware, software and firmware. [1, 2, 3] .
Given the ever-increasing wide-spread use and trade of IT products, IT security concerns are not only for the highly security-sensitive IT products. In fact, any IT products acquired from the market place present certain security risks, although with different levels of sensitivity. To use the acquired IT precuts with confidence, their security properties must be measured and made explicit. The common Criteria represent a coordinated effort addressing this issue.
Overview of the Common Criteria
The part of an IT system or product which should be evaluated based on the CC is called Target of Evaluation (TOE) and has to fulfill different security requirements which are verified by an evaluation authority. The security requirements of the CC are divided into security functional requirements (requirements on the product)and security assurance requirements (requirements on the process)and are structured into classes. The functional requirements are realized in the functions of the system in order to achieve the security objectives of the TOE. The assurance requirements contain measures to be undertaken during development in order to keep the risk for weak points low. They are necessary for guaranteeing the confidence that the TOE meets its security objectives. The number and strictness of the assurance requirements to be fulfilled depends on the Evaluation Assurance Level (EAL), as in table 1, one has chosen for the TOE [1, 2, 3] . The sub clauses in table1 provide definition of EALs highlighting differences between the specific requirements and the pros characterization of those requirements using bold type. A life-cycle model provides for the necessary control over the development and maintenance of the TOE, if the developer can supply information that shows that the model appropriately minimizes the danger of security violations in the TOE. Information given in the ST about the intended environment of the TOE and about the TOE's security objectives may be useful in defining the model for the portion of the life-cycle after the delivery of the TOE.
Integration of the CC Requirements into the Development
To develop security critical systems based on the CC, we assign the CC activities and products to software development phases. The methodology we use is described on an abstract level, independently from the chosen EAL. It is based on an iterative process. A single iteration is divided into planning phase, analysis phase, design phase, implementation phase and delivery and operation phase. In every process iteration, a fully functional system is built satisfying a defined set of requirements. After one iteration is finished, the resulting product is ready for evaluation. The following iteration starts again with the planning phase. Now, new requirements in addition to the requirements of the last iteration are defined and at the end of this iteration a new extended system can be evaluated. Fig.1 shows the relations between the CC activities and the development phases. The numbers in columns indicate number of components that are required independently of the chosen EAL and gray bars activities that are not necessary at the EALs. The following sections describe the activities and products for every phase. For the assignment of the Fig. 1 . Network Management Area Information CC-products to the phases we decided to consider the requirements of the CC as soon as possible, aiming to detect failures very early in order to counteract early and to reduce project costs [6] .
Frameworks for Assuring Developing Process for CBD-NMS on CC
The system architecture developed and used through this paper, CSA(Component Security Assurance) shown in figure 3 . It provides a schematic representation of the some inter models such as component security requirements model, assuring security model and modeling component security assurance. It shows the relationship between e-business domain and security model-based framework. Component domain requirements, security requirements model and CBD workbench/security architecture model apply in this paper context in any of the delivery tracks. However, as we'll see a little later, de-scoping may occur at regular points through the lifecycle, resulting in hybrid projects. So, for example, a solution assembly project could branch into separate smaller assembly, provisioning and integration projects. Also software requirements techniques may also be used within a e-business domain services.
They are especially useful in conjunction with prototyping, as a means of scouting ahead to explore different designs. This is particularly appropriate for e-business systems where software becomes part of the very fabric of business and the distinction between component security and solution assembly becomes naturally rather blurred 
Conclusions
In this paper, we have proposed an approach to the security characterization of software we show how integrate security aspects into the software engineering process. In addition, we also introduce our work on ensuring the reliability assurance in development process for Network Management System as TOE.
The activities and documents from the Common Criteria are tightly intertwined with the system development, which improves the quality of the developed system and reduces the additional cost and effort due to high security requirements. componentbased systems, and introduced our work on ensuring the integrity of software components as part of the infrastructural support for component based software engineering.
Our approach to security characterization is partially based on the international security evaluation standard, the Common Criteria, and aims to develop a composition model for software security. Our work on integrity assurance focuses on the development of a comprehensive authentication infrastructure for the development, distribution and use of software components.
